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INTRODUCTION

O

n Septembers, 1793, in the midst of a massive insurrection against the
French National Convention, a group of insurgents approached the bar
of the revolutionary legislature. The deputation comprised members of the
Society of Friends of Liberty and Equality-otherwise known as the Jacobin
Club-and forty-eight urban militants or sansculottes, one for each of the
wards or sections of Paris. The orator, a Jacobin named Claude Royer, ad
dressed the republican lawmakers:
Mandatories of the people, the dangers to the patrie are extreme; the
remedies must be equally [extreme]. You have decreed that the French
shall rise en masse to repulse far from our borders the hordes of brigands
who are ravaging them; but the henchmen of the despots of Vienna and
Berlin, those tigers of the North who carry devastation everywhere, are
less cruel, are less for us to fear than the traitors who agitate us from
within, who divide us, who arm Frenchman against Frenchman; the im
punity of the guiltiest ones emboldens them; the people are murmuring,
are discouraged to see the most insolent conspirators ceaselessly escape
the national ax; all the friends of liberty, of equality are astonished, indig
nant at seeing that the abettors of federalism have not yet been brought
to judgment; in the public squares, in groups, all the republicans speak
of the many crimes of Brissot; from one end of the Republic to the other
his name is uttered only with horror; we remember that this monster
was vomited by England to disturb our Revolution from the beginning
and to impede its progress.
We shall not list all his crimes when all of France accuses him; we
ask you that he be immediately judged, together with his accomplices.
The people can hardly conceive that there are still privileges under the
I
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reign of constitutional equality; that the Vergniauds, the Gensonnes,
and all the scoundrels degraded by their treasons from the dignity of
representatives of the people should have palaces for prisons while the
brave sansculottes languish in dungeons and expire every day under the
federalists' daggers. It is finally time for all the French to enjoy that holy
equality that the Constitution guarantees; it is time to overawe the trai
tors and conspirators with striking acts of justice.
Make terror the order of the day.
Let us look closely at Royer's words. The orator calls the representatives
"mandatories" (mandataires) to emphasize their submission to the people
who voted for them in France's first election based on universal male suf
frage. He congratulates the legislators for having decreed mass conscription
(levee en masse) to fight the Austrian and Prussian enemies. But his focus is
on other foes: the Girondins. These were the deputies (led by Brissot and in
cluding Vergniaud and Gensonne) who proclaimed allegiance to the Repub
lic but had been proscribed ( 11 degraded from the dignity of representatives
of the people") in an earlier insurrection (May 3 r-June 2). In the eyes of the
insurgents these men were traitors, allied to the "federalists," who, during
the summer of 1793 1 had risen up against the National Convention in a
series of municipal revolts-in Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux, and elsewhere
and imprisoned or killed "brave sansculottes." Yet the Girondins had not
yet been punished for their treasonous activities, hence the need "to over
awe the traitors and conspirators with striking acts of justice."
It was in this context that Royer uttered the famous words, "Make ter
ror the order of the day" (Placez la terreur a l'ordre du jour). What he meant
by "terror" he specified in the following sentences:
Representatives of the people, may the sword hover indiscriminately
over all heads. Promptly organize a truly revolutionary army: let this
army be divided into sections; let each of them be followed by a fright
ful [redoutable] tribunal and by the horrible [l'epouvantable] instrument
of the vengeance of the laws until the entire surface of the Republic is
purged of all traitors and until the death of the last of the conspirators.
The "truly revolutionary army," not to be confused with the regular na
tional army, was to be composed of sansculottes who would have the au
thority to arrest suspects and bring them before revolutionary tribunals. 1
These "frightful" courts would in turn quickly mete out justice in the form
of the guillotine, the "horrible instrument of the vengeance of the laws."
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Royer concluded his speech with a peroration targeting the class of ene
mies that he and his fellow insurgents believed to be at the heart of France's
troubles:
Before doing anything else, banish from all the armies that insolent caste
that has always been the enemy of liberty and equality. The nobles were
always the scourge of humanity: may they be excluded from all civil
and military positions; and to remove from them all means of harming
[us) and augmenting the number of our enemies, may they be placed
under arrest and imprisoned until the peace. Innumerable misfortunes,
acts of treachery, treasons of all sorts attest to the danger of leaving that
degraded and bloodthirsty race at the head of our armies for long. The
souls of our eviscerated brothers ask you for vengeance, and the voice of
the people commands you. 2
In this brief oration Royer sketched out a set of policies that would in
deed characterize the phase of the French Revolution cu tomarily known as
the Terror. He simultaneously outlined much of what would be thought of
as"terror" in the modern political sense: the empowerment of paramilitary
vigilantes to arrest political suspects; the use of special tribunals to deliver
summary justice (i.e., execution); and the proscription and preemptive in
carceration of a su picious class (in thi case the nobility). He thus appears
to have spontaneously defined a modern political concept. On closer inspec
tion, we shall see that a great deal of cultural work had to be done before
Royer's words could be understood and (perhaps more to the point) have an
emotional impact on those who heard or read them.
The rallying cry took off quickly. Later that day Deputy Bertrand Barere,
speaking on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety, declared that the
proposed"revolutionary army" "will finally execute this great expression
that we owe to the commune of Paris: 'Plar,ons la terreur a l'ordre ju jour.' " 3
The Commune was the municipal government, which was largely under
the control of the sansculottes. Perhaps it was there that revolutionaries in
vented the slogan.
Whoever originated the expression, soon revolutionaries throughout
France were repeating it. On September 20 the Popular Society of Langres
in the Haute-Marne department sent a letter to the Convention urging it
to" 'make terror the order of the day,' as our brothers in Paris have said." 4
On October 2 the Convention received a letter from sixty-seven citizens
who called themselves"the free Montagnards of the commune of Moyen
vic" (Moselle) and who urged the lawmakers, "Leave terror as the order of
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the day." 5 On October 6 Deputy Jacques Boilleau of the Yonne department
affirmed "that it was right to make terror the order of the day, for liberty
must be terrible when it is in the presence of despotism." 6
In the coming months many more revolutionaries spoke or wrote simi
larly. The Archives parlementaires, a multivolume compendium of docu
ments relating to the revolutionary legislatures, records 139 instances of peo
ple calling for or praising terror as "the order of the day" from September 5 1
1793, to the fall of Robespierre on July 27, 1794 (9 Thermidor). 7 Among the
lawmakers who used the expression were Danton, Barere, Billaud-Varenne,
Herault de Sechelles, and Prieur de la Marne, all of whom served on the
Committee of Public Safety and were active in implementing the Terror,
and more than a dozen other deputies are recorded as having supported ter
ror as the order of the day.8 Representatives of the Parisian sections came
repeatedly to the Convention to make the same demand/ as did members
of the Jacobin Club of Paris. 10 More than fifty provincial Jacobin clubs wrote
to the Convention, sometimes appending hundreds of signatures, to call
for terror as the order of the day or praise the legislature for having accom
plished that goal. At least twenty municipal governments sent in similarly
worded communications, as did officials in charge of districts and depart
ments, members of local "revolutionary committees," soldiers at the front,
National Guardsmen, gendarmes, and ordinary citizens.
In addition to these 139 instances, the Archives parlementaires records
nearly six hundred occurrences of revolutionaries advocating or praising
terreur between the beginning of September 1793 and the end of July 1794.
What they meant by the word varied. In some cases "terror" simply referred
to the emotion, the extreme fear that enemies of the Republic, foreign or
domestic, supposedly felt or ought to feel. In other cases it referred to the
legal apparatus of the Terror: the laws that facilitated bringing suspects up
on political charges, the Revolutionary Tribunals, and the guillotine.
It is impossible to know just how influential Royer's oration was in
the proliferation of statements promoting terror during the following ten
months. But my aim is not to determine the Jacobin's personal impact on
revolutionary discourse. I am more interested in why Royer and other revo
lutionaries spoke or wrote of terreur when describing their goals and val
ues. To twenty-first-century sensibilities the word is jarring. It is so satu
rated with implications of injustice, irrationality, fanaticism, and cruelty
that it requires a great deal of historical imagination-to say nothing of
research-to comprehend the thinking of those who conceived of terror as
a good thing. It may be surprising to many nonspecialists, as it was to me
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when I first began to study the French Revolution, that this was not a term
of abuse invented by counterrevolutionaries to discredit the Revolution,
but rather a rallying cry designed by revolutionaries themselves to legiti
mize their measures.
Yet Royer's language is not only startling in light of present-day associa
tions. It also clashes with certain elements of eighteenth-century thought,
in particular with aspects of the Enlightenment. Historians have long linked
the Enlightenment to the Revolution, either by positing a direct influence
or by noting the esteem in which revolutionaries held Enlightenment
thinkers. 11 Yet the Enlightenment is known for having militated against all
forms of fear. Even Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, the movement's
greatest critics, claimed that Enlightenment "pursued the goal of taking fear
away from human beings and establishing them as masters." 12 Where could
a positive conception of terror have fit into such a worldview? Moreover,
eighteenth-century sources would appear to support the position of Hark. heimer and Adorno. For example, Montesquieu famously identified fear (la
crainte) as the "principle" of despotism. 13
Why, then, did revolutionaries who otherwise aligned themselves with
Enlightenment principles-liberty, equality, and human rights-extoll ter
ror as a legitimizing principle and a priority ("the order of the day")?
Of course, this question is not new; contemporaries posed it as soon as
the Terror began, and apologists and critics of the Revolution have argued
over it for more than two centuries. The debate was particularly heated in
the years leading up to the bicentennial in 1989: "Jacobins" claimed that
the Revolution had faced real enemies and needed to take emergency ac
tion, while "revisionists" saw the Terror as the product of a political cul
ture in which compromise was unthinkable. I will discuss at least some of
the voluminous historiography of the Terror in the conclusion to this book.
For now I am mainly interested in addressing a set of related questions that
historians have not posed up to now. Why did the Jacobins and sansculottes
conceive of their goals for the French Republic in terms of terror? And to re
turn to Royer's speech, why did it call for la terreur a l'ordre du jour? What
was the appeal of the word "terror"? What did it mean to Royer and others
who embraced it? And finally (and more speculatively), how did the word feel?
What emotions did it evoke in those who uttered, heard, wrote, or read it?
These questions are relevant to an understanding of why the revolu
tionaries adopted the policies conventionally understood as the Terror. The
name a political group adopts for its program is no doubt relevant to its suc
cess. Appealing slogans help to solidify loyalties, and it seems likely to me

6

INTRODUCTION

that by using the language of terror, revolutionaries stimulated enthusiasm
for the Terror. But it would be naive to assume that this language was the
only cause, or even the principal cause, of the Terror.
At one level, then, my goal in this book-explaining the appeal of the
word "terror"-is more modest than that of historians who have sought
an overarching or comprehensive explanation of the Terror. Yet at another
level my goal is more ambitious. To explain why requires a. clear statement
of my thesis: the appeal to terror in the French Revolution was conceivable
and popular because it drew on a long tradition of writing and thinking in
which terror was a good thing. According to this tradition, God instilled ter
ror in his creatures-and rightly so. Kings derived their power from God and
were consequently praised for the terror they inspired in enemies. (They
were often flattered precisely as "the terror" of their enemies.) Society de
pended on the "terror of the laws." Terror had positive aesthetic value, pro
viding a precondition for both high-quality theater and "the sublime." It
even had medicinal value and was widely believed capable of treating or
curing numerous illnesses. To support these claims, it is necessary to delve
into the much-neglected history of attitudes toward terror prior to the Rev
olution.14 I have chosen approximately one century of this history because a
longer sweep would have been beyond my capacities, but I also believe that
a century is sufficient to make my case. The result of this investigation
and here is the book's more ambitious goal-will be a contribution to the
history of Western attitudes toward terror. So much of our contemporary
political discourse takes an orientalist approach to terror and characterizes
it as an invention of the inveterate foes of Western civilization. It is impor
tant, I believe, to disrupt this narrative by recounting a significant chapter
in what might be called the Western romance with terror.
But what exactly is the subject of this book? Is "terror" an idea? A con
cept? A discourse? A word? And what methods will be employed in its
study?
On one level, this book is a traditional contribution to intellectual his
tory, with significant attention paid to ideas. I do not believe that the word
"terror" corresponds precisely to a discrete idea, but certain recurrent ideas
appear in conjunction with the word. To give just one example, there is the
idea of salutary terror, according to which the experience of terror is pro
ductive of health, safety, or even salvation. I would even go so far as to argue
that salutary terror is a "unit-idea," as defined by Arthur Lovejoy, insofar as
it appears in different periods in history (from the Bible to Augustine to the
Enlightenment and finally the French Revolution), in different "provinces
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of history" (e.g., theology, jurisprudence, aesthetics, and medicine) and in
both canonical and noncanonical sources. 15
Yet the history of terror before the Terror is more than the history of an
idea. The word "terror" had (and no doubt still has) too many meanings to
be contained by a single idea. Conceivably, then, it is more of a concept than
an idea. Reinhart Koselleck characterized concepts (Begriffe] as inherently
mehrdeutig, a term that can mean "ambiguous" but is more literally trans
lated as "polysemous" or "multivalent." According to Koselleck, a concept,
unlike a mere word, contained a "plenitude" (Fiille) of meanings. Koselleck
gave as an example the concept of the state (Staat), which included within
it such diverse things as "dominion, territory, citizenship, legislation, ju
risdiction, administration," and so on. 16 Could terror also be an example of
such a "plenitude" or concentrate? Certainly it was multivalent. It could
indicate an emotion, a form of fear (specifically, an extreme, gripping fear),
a style of rule, or a military tactic; or, metonymically, it could stand for the
.source of terror, as when rulers, commanders, or nations were the "terror"
of their enemies. During the Revolution it often meant the policies adopted
between September 1793 and July 1794, and subsequently the word served
as the name of a period that had ended with the fall of Robespierre.
There is an argument to be made for terror having become a concept pre
cisely during the Year II, when a disparate field of the word's earlier mean
ings came together in the Terror. Indeed, the capitalization of the word, a
practice as early as December 1793, suggested a kind of congealing or con
centration of prior meanings. 17 That terror became a concept at this point is
suggested by the "Terror, Terrorismus" entry in the monument to concep
tual history (Begriffsgeschichte), the multivolume lexicon that Koselleck co
edited: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Basic concepts in history). Actually,
to call it an entry does it a disservice: it is more of a monograph, comprising
122 pages, 622 footnotes, and roughly 60,000 words. But nearly one hundred
of these pages are devoted to the postrevolutionary period, and only eleven
pages are allocated to the meanings of "terror" under the Old Regime. This
is because the author, Rudolf Walther, sees references to terror in the pre
revolutionary period as constituting the "prehistory" (Vorgeschichte) of the
concept. The section on the Revolution also comprises eleven pages. But for
Walther, terror becomes a concept only in 1793-94, when for him its actual
history begins; and the remainder of the article, approximately one hundred
pages, deals with Terrorismus as understood throughout Europe from the
fall of Robespierre to the 197os. 18 A similar pattern can be seen in Gerd van
den Heuvel's article "Terreur, Terroriste, Terrorisme," in the Handbuch
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politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820 (Handbook of
basic political and social concepts in France, 1680-1820), edited by Rolf Reich
ardt and Eberhard Schmitt. In this eighteen-thousand-word entry fewer than
three thousand words are allocated to the Old Regime. 19
My objection to treating the meanings of terror in the Old Regime as a
"prehistory" is that the term is teleological and suggests an inevitable un
folding of "history." Of course, one could object that the term "Old Regime"
is equally teleological, as is the adjective "prerevolutionary." But some of
Koselleck's other remarks about Begriffe and especially Grundbegriffe (fun
damental concepts) indicate a belief in a metanarrative about the course of
history that I do not share. Specifically, Koselleck believes that the prolif
eration of Grundbegriffe between 1750 and 1850 reveals "the dissolution of
the old world and the emergence of the modern world. 1120 My emphasis is
much more on continuities than on "the emergence of the modern world."
Indeed, the value placed on terror (and "the Terror") in the Revolution de
pended heavily on traditions that might otherwise be dismissed as "prehis
tory." Moreover, Koselleck wrote of words' being "promoted" to the status
of "modern concepts," which similarly hints at a predetermined telos.21 As
a heuristic device, the distinction between words and concepts has some
value. Specifically, it could be used to argue that the long-standing valoriza
tion of the word terreur facilitated a similar valorization of the concept of
la Terreur. I shall return to this question in the conclusion, but for now it is
important to observe that even if terror (or the Terror) can be understood as
a concept, this takes place only at the end of my story. Ultimately, the unit
of analysis in this book is a word (or, to be linguistically precise, a lexeme),
not a concept.22
To use a distinction adopted from semantics, the emphasis is on sema
siology (the study of what particular words or phrases mean) rather than
onomasiology (the study of the words or phrases that are used to indicate a
particular concept or idea). In other words, rather than asking the onomasio
logical question, "What words or phrases were used to express the concept or
idea of terror?" I will be asking the semasiological question, "What did the
word 'terror' and phrases including it (such as 'salutary terror' or 'the terror of
his enemies') mean to those who wrote, uttered, heard or read them?"23 And
I will be adding the question, "How did it feel to say, hear, write, or read it?"
The subject of this book, then, is what I am choosing to call "terror
speech." This terminology deserves explanation lest it be misunderstood.
The word "speech" often refers to the act of talking and could potentially be
reminiscent of the expression "rights talk," which the conservative Ameri
can legal scholar Mary Ann Glendon simultaneously popularized and dis-

INTRODUCTION

9

paraged.24 Although Dan Edelstein has more recently used the expression
evenhandedly, Glendon's imperious attitude toward "talk," which looks
very much like"chatter," might remain in some readers' minds.25 In the pres
ent book, however, the word "speech" is strictly descriptive. Rather than
implying the laziness of"talk," it describes both oral and written expression
and includes both systematic statements and casual remarks. In this respect
it borrows from the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure's idea that speech (la pa
role) is simply language as it is used in everyday life, as opposed to language
(la langue), which is conceived as a formal system of rules.26
My research questions and methodology are informed by the kind of his
torical semantics practiced by Nietzsche and embraced by Foucault. Trained
in the nineteenth-century philological tradition, Nietzsche was sensitive
to the changing meanings of words, and he applied thi awareness most
famously in his book On the Genealogy of Morals, where he argued that
the word "good" had originally referred to amoral personal attributes such
as strength, health, and power but with the advent of Christianity came to
have moral meanings (e.g., meekness, selflessness), while what the pagans
had valued as"good" came to be seen as"evil." 27 As Foucault observed, Nietz
sche's notion of "genealogy" is a corrective to the tendency of historians
to search for origins. Whereas "origins" imply inevitable outcomes, gene
alogy "must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous
finality." 28 A Genealogy of Terror likewise e chews a teleological search for
origins and recognizes that the history that occurred is not the history that
had to occur. It does not argue that a tradition of valorizing terror made it
inevitable that revolutionaries would embrace the language of terror, still
less that the Terror as we know it wa the unavoidable consequence of a
culture in which terror was praised. In other respects the revolutionaries
departed from past practice; they were not doomed to embrace thi particu
lar tradition. Moreover, other European countries similarly had traditions of
valorizing terror in multiple contexts, whereas the Terror took place only in
France.29 Nietzsche is also helpful-and not only filtered through Foucault's
interpretation-because his genealogy provided a classic example of what he
called "transvaluation" (Umwertu"lg). 30 Just as Christianity turned "good"
characteristics into "evil" ones, in Nietzsche's view, beginning in late 1794
France saw a revolution in common understandings of terror. Long an in
dicator of glory, majesty, legitimacy, and other positive qualities, "terror"
came to stand almost exclusively for cruel and pointless violence. Although
my study focuses on the "before" side of this revolution, a Nietzschean con
ception of Umwertung enables us to appreciate the historical changes that
have occurred in attitudes toward terror since 1794.
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A further advantage of the genealogical approach is that it highlights
emotions. Foucault writes of genealogy, "It must seek [events] in the most
unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history-in senti
ments, love, conscience, instincts."31 This proposition is particularly appro
priate for the study of the word "terror," which among other things refers
to an emotion. Any attempt to trace the history of an emotion word must
reckon with the "emotional turn" in the humanities and social sciences.
Particularly relevant to this study is William Reddy's Navigation of Feeling:
A Framework for the History of Emotions. In that groundbreaking work
Reddy introduces the concept of the "emotive." Drawing on J. L. Austin's
distinction between"constative" or purely descriptive statements and"per
formative" statements (such as "I hereby pronounce you man and wife")
that do things, Reddy adds a third kind of statement that he calls an "emo
tive. "32 One example of an emotive is "I am angry." Drawing on studies of
cognitive psychology, Reddy notes that people change their emotional state
in the process of uttering statements about what they perceive that state to
be. Thus a person who says "I am angry" might become even angrier in the
process and immediate aftermath of making the statement; on the other hand,
she might also notice that she is not as angry as she thought and as a result
become calmer. In either case, the act of making an emotional claim changes
the emotional condition of the person who makes it.33
Emotives allow Reddy to make a larger argument about the importance
of assessing the"liberty" or oppressiveness of"emotional regimes" by gaug
ing the range of emotions they allow. My aim in this book is not to assess
the emotional liberty of the Old Regime or the Revolution, but Reddy's con
cept of the emotive is helpful because it provides a model for interpreting
statements about emotional conditions. Strictly speaking, most of the state
ments in this book that include the word "terror" do not meet Reddy's stan
dard for emotives, since Reddy restricts this designation for first-person,
present-tense statements, and most of the statements analyzed here are in
the second or third person.34 But I would like to suggest that even second
and third-person statements regarding terror can be understood as emotives
insofar as they changed the emotional condition of the person who uttered
or wrote them. Take, for example, the words of Bishop Jean-Baptiste Massil
lon in a speech he made in the 1720s or 1730s (later published in a book) to
priests about "the need for ministers to renew the spirit of their vocation."
Massillon claimed that whereas priests typically grew "insensitive" to the
environment of the Mass, infrequent churchgoers responded much more
emotionally. He claimed, "The believer who rarely approaches the altar is
struck with holy terror [ d'une sainte terreur] when he has to participate
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in such a frightful [redoutable] action: the approach of a solemn ceremony
[i.e., the Eucharist] . . . reminds him of himself; he feels all of his indignity;
he throws himself at our feet, filled with fear [crainte] and compunction."
Priests, on the other hand, are used to "this terrible [terrible] ceremony,"
and therefore it loses its effect. The Mass "does not awaken anything in us,
neither fervor nor terror [terreur] of holy things, nor pain at our faults, nor
resolutions of a more priestly and faithful life."35 It is reasonable to assume
that Massillon felt something as he employed the word terreur (to say noth
ing of the related words terrible, redoutable, and crainte), though he did so
in third-person statements. Without speculating in depth on how Massillon
felt, we are justified in believing that it felt good to use this word, which
was so closely linked to the holines and majesty of God and the prospect of
personal salvation. Indeed, the word terreur was linked with its opposite
hope or confidence-and was only truly fearful when Massillon considered
its absence in the hearts of jaded priests.36 It is perfectly plausible that the
word had similar emotional connotations for those who heard or read Mas
sillon's speech.
Or consider the letter that General Jean-Baptiste Jourdan wrote to the
National Convention on October r6, 1793. It described a "bloody battle
against the vile slaves of despots" in which 6000 enemy troops were killed
and 200 republican soldiers were lost but which resulted in the restoration
of the city of Maubeuge to French control. The letter ended with the claim,
"Terror has taken hold of our enemies and I believe it will be impossible
for these slaves to withstand the courageous efforts of our brave republi
cans."37 Jourdan's statement about the emotional condition of the enemy
was a third-person claim and therefore (according to Reddy) a constative.
But was it not pleasurable for Jourdan to de cribe the terror he imputed to
the enemy? The accompanying claim about the "courageous" condition of
the "brave" republicans suggested that it was precisely the prospect of a
terrified enemy that emboldened or encouraged Jourdan and hi soldiers.
Presumably the general also expected the lawmakers and the French public
(who read his letter in newspapers) to feel similarly encouraged.
Of course, in the former example terror was a good thing for a good per
son to feel, and in the latter it was good for the enemy to feel. Paradoxically,
Massillon expected feelings of terror to be reassuring, but Jourdan's reason
ing was more straightforward, suggesting that it was salutary for the French
when the enemy experienced terror. But in both cases a claim of terror made
in the third person appears to have felt good to the person making the claim
and may also have felt good to the claimants' readers or auditors. Thus in
both cases the word terreur had a positive emotional valence.
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It might be objected that any speculation on the emotional condition
of people in the past is, well, speculation. But historians are normally con
fident that they can apprehend the cognitive state of people in the past or, to
use Keith Michael Baker's expression, to describe their process of "intellec
tion."38 How different are emotions and cognition? Again The Navigation of
Feeling can be helpful. In that book and elsewhere Reddy relays the findings
of many cognitive psychologists who have failed to distinguish between the
two mental processes.39 I am therefore less skeptical than historians such
as Peter and Carol Stearns, who have contented themselves with "emotion
ology," or the examination of which emotions a particular society deemed
appropriate, though a considerable part of the present study will be to deter
mine who was expected to feel terror and under what circumstances.40 Nor
do I think it necessary to stop at the "emotional communities" that Barbara
Rosenwein argues will "help us understand how people articulated, under
stood, and represented how they felt," and I disagree that this is "about all
we can know about anyone's feelings apart from our own."41 Absolute cer
tainty in such matters is unlikely, but a reasonable approximation on the
basis of evidence is possible.
What were the emotional connotations of terreur before and during the
French Revolution? In order to provide at least a partial answer, this book
examines six distinct subjects or genres-or, to use Lovejoy's expression,
"provinces of history"-in which "terror" played a prominent role.42 The
first of these genres consists of theological expressions, specifically in the
Judea-Christian tradition. Chapter I examines both the Latin and French
editions of the Bible available to Old Regime readers as well as a diverse
array of theological writings by ultramontane Catholics, heterodox Jan
senists, and even some anticlerical philosophes to show that "terror" (Lat.
terror, Fr. terreur) was widely described as the proper condition of human
beings before their Creator. (We have already seen this in the example of
Massillon.) One of God's principal attributes was accordingly his terror (or
terribleness),43 a trait that corresponded to his power, glory, and righteous
ness. In short, referring to God as the being who most appropriately instills
terror was another way of highlighting his majesty. Chapter 2 examines
another form of majesty: that which was attributed to kings and expressed
in what might be called the speech of sovereign terror. Here the princi
pal sources are political writings, some more philosophical, others more
strictly acclamatory, in which kings are described as rightfully instilling
terror in their enemies or even as being the terror of those enemies. Insofar
as kings reputedly derived their power from God, their terribleness was ev
ery bit as holy and therefore legitimate as God's. Chapter 3 explores legal
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writings, especially those works of jurisprudence that commented on the
kinds of punishments most effective in instilling terror in criminals and
potential malefactors. Here one encounters such expressions as "the terror
of the laws" and "the terror of punishments." We retain these concepts in
the word "deter," which literally means "to terrify from [committing an
act]," though when using the word "terror" Old Regime legal commenta
tors simultaneously evoked the majesty of the law and of the earthly and
heavenly sovereigns who created it. Chapters 4 and 5 examine aesthetic
writings. In chapter 4 the emphasis is on theater criticism, and in particular
commentary on the perceived necessity of terror as a component of trag
edy. The argument is that while many commentators recalled Aristotle's
maxim that a tragedy must evoke terror and pity in spectators, increasingly
in the course of the eighteenth century theater critics ignored the "pity"
side of the dyad and stressed the need for terror. The effect of terror on au
diences was thought to be morally improving, whether spectators then
"purged" the emotion (as Aristotle prescribed) or maintained it. In similar
fashion, chapter 5 shows the link in aesthetic philosophy between terror
and "the sublime." Focusing on Edmund Burke's key contribution to the
discussion-his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and the Beautiful (1757) was translated into French in 1765 and
clearly influenced Diderot, among other French writers-it traces the no
tion that in order for a work of art or experience of nature to be "sublime" it
had to impart terror. A crucial component of Burke's plea on behalf of terror
was the conviction that the emotion was healthful. (Burke maintained that
terror impacted the mind in the same way that physical exercise affected
the body.) In chapter 6 we shall see that many medical writers concurred
on the "salutary" effect of terror on the human organism, and that both
learned treatises and popular digests of medical knowledge made extraordi
nary claims on behalf of the emotion. Thus terror (though recognized to be
typically dangerous) was capable on occasion of curing a variety of illnesses.
Notably, a doctor named Jean-Paul Marat shared the widespread belief that
terror could imbue the human organism with extraordinary strength. 44 This
chapter raises the question of whether revolutionary beliefs about the salu
tary effects of terror on the "body politic" might have been informed by Old
Regime medical thinking. Taken together, the first six chapters of the book
point to a tradition of valorizing "terror" and suggest that the word often
had positive emotional connotations.
The last two chapters trace terror speech, both spoken and written, in
the Revolution. The principal source for this section is the Archives par
lementaires, particularly volumes 9 through 93. Chapter 7 analyses "terror
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before the Terror," or terror speech from June 1789 through August 1793.
It argues that the revolutionaries of this phase inherited from the Old Re
gime both the language of judicial terror, which was used to legitimize new
laws (including the Constitution), and the idea of terror as a weapon to be
wielded against the nation's enemies. It also shows that "terror" was an
ecumenical term, used not only by radical Jacobins or Montagnards but by
their "moderate" enemies the Girondins, and even the conservative Feuil
lants, who sought to preserve the power of the monarchy. This universality
helped to make it an attractive rallying cry during Year II of the Republic.
Chapter 8 examines terror speech during the Terror itself (September 5 1
1793-July 27, 1794). Here we find a decline in utilitarian or "exemplary"
terror, in which the prospect of punishment deters adversaries, and an in
crease in the sense of terror as a principle of vengeance and extermination.
Moreover, terror paradoxically became holy in much the way it had been
for Bishop Massillon. This can be seen in the language surrounding "the
Mountain, 11 a term that originally meant simply the radical members of the
National Convention who sat on the highest benches of the assembly hall
but came to be described as a 11 holy Mountain," capable of casting thun
derbolts and spewing lava at France's enemies. The atmospheric effects of
this figurative geographical feature also resembled prerevolutionary state
ments about the terrible sublime, and those revolutionaries who praised the
Mountain for conjuring fresh air and drying up the miasmas of the counter
revolutionary 11 swamp" (marais) recalled medical ideas about salutary ter
ror. In addition, chapter 8 argues that terror speech was therapeutic to the
revolutionaries of the Year II. Specifically, those who used it contrasted the
terror supposedly felt by enemies with their own feelings of "consolation,"
11
11 hope," "confidence, 11 and
courage."
From the very beginning of the Revolution to the fall of Robespierre, as
both chapters 7 and 8 will show, 11 terror" retained its prerevolutionary emo
tional connotations. It still felt good to utter, write1 hear, or read the word.
The source of this feeling was a set of ideas-and here again ideas and feel
ings are closely linked-including security1 safety, and salvation. Terror was
salutary not only in the sense of saving the person experiencing it by deter
ring dangerous behavior1 but also in the sense of preserving society from the
danger posed by its enemies. Moreover1 it recalled the salvation that accord
ing to prerevolutionary generations had come from a terrible1 glorious God.
In this context the revolutionary word salut, often translated as II safety," also
alluded to salvation.
Finally1 a conclusion will place this book's findings in the context of
the historiographical literature on the Terror, navigating between ideological
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and circumstantial explanations and addressing more recent scholarship that
takes an "emotional turn." The conclusion will also highlight the sudden
shifts in the meaning of "terror" that took place in the days and weeks fol
lowing the fall of Robespierre. It identifies the Thermidorian period as the
moment when the word lost its connotations of justice, legitimacy, majesty,
and salvation and came instead to indicate unjust and pointless violence.
The following excursion through six provinces of history-not count
ing revolutionary France-might at times feel like a frenetic dash, the first
casualty of which will be contextualization. I will rarely linger in my de
scriptions of the historical actors behind the statements that constitute
the core of this story, and-until my account of the Revolution-I will say
little about the social and intellectual contexts in which they were uttered
or written. Contextualists in the tradition of Quentin Skinner might be
disappointed by this approach, but part of the rea on for this contextual
sparseness is simply practical. I am not a pecialist in biblical studies or
the history of French Catholicism. I am not an expert in Old Regime po
litical theology, jurisprudence, theater critici m, aesthetics or medicine. A
fully contextualized study of each prerevolutionary chapter would al o add
considerably to the book's length. Nor do I believe it would ub tantially
change the argument. For example, in the chapt r on medical under tand
ings of terror, I could linger over the eighteenth-century transition from
Galenic to neurological models or discuss how a new generation of vital
ists oppo ed their Cartesian/mechani t forebears, but none of thi would
change my main point in that chapter, which is the fact that phy icians
whatever their intellectual or social affiliations-often credited terror with
the power to cure illnesses or impart strength to th body. Peter Gordon ha
recently argued that contextualism ha limited explanatory power in works
of intellectual history. 45 I believe this book to be an example of a tudy that
calls for only limited contextualization.
Did "terror" always have positive emotional connotation during the
prerevolutionary period? Certainly not. For Old Regime and revolutionary
commentators alike, the word could be a term of abuse denoting de potism,
and though Montesquieu typically used the word crainte (fear) to de cribe
the "principle" of despotism, others substituted the term terreur. 46 Simi
larly, for numerous philosophes "terror" (or, more frequently, "terrors") de
noted the "superstitious" fear of hell promoted by the church and allegedly
designed to control credulous people. 47 My argument is not that terror was
always a good thing in the utterances, oral or written, of Old Regime and
revolutionary commentators, but that there was a strong enough tradition
of positive terror speech to make the term an attractive option for a rallying
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cry in September 1793. I am not suggesting that "terror" as the "order of the
day" was an inevitable slogan; rather, I am providing reasons for its having
been a thinkable one. 48
The difference between terror speech for most of the eighteenth century
and terror speech after the Terror is not that "terror" was initially consid
ered a good thing and subsequently a bad thing. Rather, the word went from
having both positive and negative meanings to having almost exclusively
negative ones. "Terror" most certainly has a postrevolutionary history as
well, with the conflation of terror and (a specific form of) terrorism after
9/rr defining the most recent chapter. But it was the Revolution-or more
specifically a set of narratives about the Revolution produced after the fall
of Robespierre-that largely bequeathed to us the set of emotional connota
tions attached to the word today.
Robert Darnton has advised students of history, "When we cannot get
a proverb, or a joke, or a poem, we know we are on to something. By pick
ing at the document where it is most opaque, we may be able to unravel an
alien system of meaning." 49 A more old-fashioned way of putting this comes
from Herder, who believed that one of the primary goals of historical study
was "to feel oneself into" (sich hineinfiihlen) a different age. 5° Few things
are harder to "get" today than the expression Placez la terreur a l'ordre du
jour, and few things are harder to "feel oneself into" than a culture in which
la terreur could sound and feel good. But the stakes are high. Even partial
success will provide a better understanding of both the French Revolution
and the history of Western attitudes toward terror. Let us therefore look
more closely into the genealogy of terror in eighteenth-century France.

